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Consensus: Remove calls to error() and FormatStateMessage() from some consensus code in main

tags/v0.15.1
Jorge Timón 5 years ago
parent
commit
93fc58c742
1 changed files with 32 additions and 51 deletions
  1. 32
    51
      src/main.cpp

+ 32
- 51
src/main.cpp View File

@@ -814,12 +814,13 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, bool fRejectAbsurdFee,
std::vector<uint256>& vHashTxnToUncache)
{
const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (pfMissingInputs)
*pfMissingInputs = false;

if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state))
return false;
return error("%s: CheckTransaction: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));

// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
@@ -837,7 +838,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");

// is it already in the memory pool?
uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
if (pool.exists(hash))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_ALREADY_KNOWN, "txn-already-in-mempool");

@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
// Check against previous transactions
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, true, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS, true))
return false;
return error("%s: CheckInputs: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));

// Check again against just the consensus-critical mandatory script
// verification flags, in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
@@ -1964,7 +1964,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin

// Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));

// verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block
uint256 hashPrevBlock = pindex->pprev == NULL ? uint256() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash();
@@ -2909,13 +2909,11 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state, bool f
{
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, Params().GetConsensus()))
return state.DoS(50, error("CheckBlockHeader(): proof of work failed"),
REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash");
return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");

// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() + 2 * 60 * 60)
return state.Invalid(error("CheckBlockHeader(): block timestamp too far in the future"),
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new");
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");

return true;
}
@@ -2937,15 +2935,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): hashMerkleRoot mismatch"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true);
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");

// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
// while still invalidating it.
if (mutated)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): duplicate transaction"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true);
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction");
}

// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@@ -2954,24 +2950,20 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo

// Size limits
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE || ::GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): size limits failed"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");

// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0].IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): first tx is not coinbase"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase");
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
if (block.vtx[i].IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): more than one coinbase"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase");

// Check transactions
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state))
return error("CheckBlock(): CheckTransaction of %s failed with %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(),
FormatStateMessage(state));
return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage()));

unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
@@ -2979,8 +2971,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(tx);
}
if (nSigOps > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): out-of-bounds SigOpCount"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");

if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
block.fChecked = true;
@@ -3007,28 +2998,17 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& sta
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
// Check proof of work
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: incorrect proof of work", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work");

// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block's timestamp is too early", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old");

// Reject block.nVersion=1 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 2 && IsSuperMajority(2, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=1 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");

// Reject block.nVersion=2 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 3 && IsSuperMajority(3, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=2 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");

// Reject block.nVersion=3 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 4 && IsSuperMajority(4, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s : rejected nVersion=3 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
for (int32_t version = 2; version < 5; ++version) // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
if (block.nVersion < version && IsSuperMajority(version, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(v%d)", version - 1),
strprintf("rejected nVersion=%d block", version - 1));

return true;
}
@@ -3045,7 +3025,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn
? pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()
: block.GetBlockTime();
if (!IsFinalTx(tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
return state.DoS(10, error("%s: contains a non-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
}
}

@@ -3056,7 +3036,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: block height mismatch in coinbase", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}

@@ -3083,7 +3063,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state
}

if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));

// Get prev block index
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = NULL;
@@ -3099,7 +3079,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state
return error("%s: CheckIndexAgainstCheckpoint(): %s", __func__, state.GetRejectReason().c_str());

if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
if (pindex == NULL)
pindex = AddToBlockIndex(block);
@@ -3146,7 +3126,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const CCha
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex);
}
return false;
return error("%s: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
}

int nHeight = pindex->nHeight;
@@ -3197,7 +3177,7 @@ bool ProcessNewBlock(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams, c
bool fRequested = MarkBlockAsReceived(pblock->GetHash());
fRequested |= fForceProcessing;
if (!checked) {
return error("%s: CheckBlock FAILED", __func__);
return error("%s: CheckBlock FAILED %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
}

// Store to disk
@@ -3231,11 +3211,11 @@ bool TestBlockValidity(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams,

// NOTE: CheckBlockHeader is called by CheckBlock
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, fCheckPOW, fCheckMerkleRoot))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!ConnectBlock(block, state, &indexDummy, viewNew, true))
return false;
assert(state.IsValid());
@@ -3565,7 +3545,8 @@ bool CVerifyDB::VerifyDB(const CChainParams& chainparams, CCoinsView *coinsview,
return error("VerifyDB(): *** ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
// check level 1: verify block validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state))
return error("VerifyDB(): *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return error("%s: *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n", __func__,
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
// check level 2: verify undo validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) {
CBlockUndo undo;

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