You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.

688 lines
20 KiB

// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2012 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
// file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_WALLET_H
#define BITCOIN_WALLET_H
#include "bignum.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "keystore.h"
#include "script.h"
class CWalletTx;
class CReserveKey;
class CWalletDB;
/** (client) version numbers for particular wallet features */
enum WalletFeature
{
FEATURE_BASE = 10500, // the earliest version new wallets supports (only useful for getinfo's clientversion output)
FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT = 40000, // wallet encryption
FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY = 60000, // compressed public keys
FEATURE_LATEST = 60000
};
/** A CWallet is an extension of a keystore, which also maintains a set of transactions and balances,
* and provides the ability to create new transactions.
*/
class CWallet : public CCryptoKeyStore
{
private:
bool SelectCoinsMinConf(int64 nTargetValue, int nConfMine, int nConfTheirs, std::set<std::pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, int64& nValueRet) const;
bool SelectCoins(int64 nTargetValue, std::set<std::pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, int64& nValueRet) const;
CWalletDB *pwalletdbEncryption;
// the current wallet version: clients below this version are not able to load the wallet
int nWalletVersion;
// the maxmimum wallet format version: memory-only variable that specifies to what version this wallet may be upgraded
int nWalletMaxVersion;
public:
mutable CCriticalSection cs_wallet;
bool fFileBacked;
std::string strWalletFile;
std::set<int64> setKeyPool;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
typedef std::map<unsigned int, CMasterKey> MasterKeyMap;
MasterKeyMap mapMasterKeys;
unsigned int nMasterKeyMaxID;
CWallet()
{
nWalletVersion = FEATURE_BASE;
nWalletMaxVersion = FEATURE_BASE;
fFileBacked = false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
nMasterKeyMaxID = 0;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
}
CWallet(std::string strWalletFileIn)
{
nWalletVersion = FEATURE_BASE;
nWalletMaxVersion = FEATURE_BASE;
strWalletFile = strWalletFileIn;
fFileBacked = true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
nMasterKeyMaxID = 0;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
}
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx> mapWallet;
std::vector<uint256> vWalletUpdated;
std::map<uint256, int> mapRequestCount;
std::map<CBitcoinAddress, std::string> mapAddressBook;
std::vector<unsigned char> vchDefaultKey;
// check whether we are allowed to upgrade (or already support) to the named feature
bool CanSupportFeature(enum WalletFeature wf) { return nWalletMaxVersion >= wf; }
// keystore implementation
// Generate a new key
std::vector<unsigned char> GenerateNewKey();
// Adds a key to the store, and saves it to disk.
bool AddKey(const CKey& key);
// Adds a key to the store, without saving it to disk (used by LoadWallet)
bool LoadKey(const CKey& key) { return CCryptoKeyStore::AddKey(key); }
bool LoadMinVersion(int nVersion) { nWalletVersion = nVersion; nWalletMaxVersion = std::max(nWalletMaxVersion, nVersion); return true; }
// Adds an encrypted key to the store, and saves it to disk.
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
bool AddCryptedKey(const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret);
// Adds an encrypted key to the store, without saving it to disk (used by LoadWallet)
bool LoadCryptedKey(const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret) { SetMinVersion(FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT); return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret); }
bool AddCScript(const CScript& redeemScript);
bool LoadCScript(const CScript& redeemScript) { return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript); }
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
bool Unlock(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase);
bool ChangeWalletPassphrase(const SecureString& strOldWalletPassphrase, const SecureString& strNewWalletPassphrase);
bool EncryptWallet(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase);
void MarkDirty();
bool AddToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn);
bool AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock, bool fUpdate = false, bool fFindBlock = false);
bool EraseFromWallet(uint256 hash);
void WalletUpdateSpent(const CTransaction& prevout);
int ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate = false);
int ScanForWalletTransaction(const uint256& hashTx);
void ReacceptWalletTransactions();
void ResendWalletTransactions();
int64 GetBalance() const;
int64 GetUnconfirmedBalance() const;
bool CreateTransaction(const std::vector<std::pair<CScript, int64> >& vecSend, CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, int64& nFeeRet);
bool CreateTransaction(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, int64& nFeeRet);
bool CommitTransaction(CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey);
std::string SendMoney(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew, bool fAskFee=false);
std::string SendMoneyToBitcoinAddress(const CBitcoinAddress& address, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew, bool fAskFee=false);
bool NewKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
bool TopUpKeyPool();
int64 AddReserveKey(const CKeyPool& keypool);
void ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(int64& nIndex, CKeyPool& keypool);
void KeepKey(int64 nIndex);
void ReturnKey(int64 nIndex);
bool GetKeyFromPool(std::vector<unsigned char> &key, bool fAllowReuse=true);
int64 GetOldestKeyPoolTime();
void GetAllReserveAddresses(std::set<CBitcoinAddress>& setAddress);
bool IsMine(const CTxIn& txin) const;
int64 GetDebit(const CTxIn& txin) const;
bool IsMine(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
return ::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey);
}
int64 GetCredit(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetCredit() : value out of range");
return (IsMine(txout) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool IsChange(const CTxOut& txout) const;
int64 GetChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetChange() : value out of range");
return (IsChange(txout) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool IsMine(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
if (IsMine(txout))
return true;
return false;
}
bool IsFromMe(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
return (GetDebit(tx) > 0);
}
int64 GetDebit(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
int64 nDebit = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
nDebit += GetDebit(txin);
if (!MoneyRange(nDebit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetDebit() : value out of range");
}
return nDebit;
}
int64 GetCredit(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
int64 nCredit = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
{
nCredit += GetCredit(txout);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetCredit() : value out of range");
}
return nCredit;
}
int64 GetChange(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
int64 nChange = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut& txout, tx.vout)
{
nChange += GetChange(txout);
if (!MoneyRange(nChange))
throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GetChange() : value out of range");
}
return nChange;
}
void SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc);
}
int LoadWallet(bool& fFirstRunRet);
// bool BackupWallet(const std::string& strDest);
bool SetAddressBookName(const CBitcoinAddress& address, const std::string& strName);
bool DelAddressBookName(const CBitcoinAddress& address);
void UpdatedTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
vWalletUpdated.push_back(hashTx);
}
}
void PrintWallet(const CBlock& block);
void Inventory(const uint256 &hash)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, int>::iterator mi = mapRequestCount.find(hash);
if (mi != mapRequestCount.end())
(*mi).second++;
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
11 years ago
int GetKeyPoolSize()
{
return setKeyPool.size();
}
bool GetTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx, CWalletTx& wtx);
bool SetDefaultKey(const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchPubKey);
// signify that a particular wallet feature is now used. this may change nWalletVersion and nWalletMaxVersion if those are lower
bool SetMinVersion(enum WalletFeature, CWalletDB* pwalletdbIn = NULL, bool fExplicit = false);
// change which version we're allowed to upgrade to (note that this does not immediately imply upgrading to that format)
bool SetMaxVersion(int nVersion);
// get the current wallet format (the oldest client version guaranteed to understand this wallet)
int GetVersion() { return nWalletVersion; }
};
/** A key allocated from the key pool. */
class CReserveKey
{
protected:
CWallet* pwallet;
int64 nIndex;
std::vector<unsigned char> vchPubKey;
public:
CReserveKey(CWallet* pwalletIn)
{
nIndex = -1;
pwallet = pwalletIn;
}
~CReserveKey()
{
if (!fShutdown)
ReturnKey();
}
void ReturnKey();
std::vector<unsigned char> GetReservedKey();
void KeepKey();
};
/** A transaction with a bunch of additional info that only the owner cares about.
* It includes any unrecorded transactions needed to link it back to the block chain.
*/
class CWalletTx : public CMerkleTx
{
private:
const CWallet* pwallet;
public:
std::vector<CMerkleTx> vtxPrev;
std::map<std::string, std::string> mapValue;
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > vOrderForm;
unsigned int fTimeReceivedIsTxTime;
unsigned int nTimeReceived; // time received by this node
char fFromMe;
std::string strFromAccount;
std::vector<char> vfSpent; // which outputs are already spent
// memory only
mutable char fDebitCached;
mutable char fCreditCached;
mutable char fAvailableCreditCached;
mutable char fChangeCached;
mutable int64 nDebitCached;
mutable int64 nCreditCached;
mutable int64 nAvailableCreditCached;
mutable int64 nChangeCached;
// memory only UI hints
mutable unsigned int nTimeDisplayed;
mutable int nLinesDisplayed;
mutable char fConfirmedDisplayed;
CWalletTx()
{
Init(NULL);
}
CWalletTx(const CWallet* pwalletIn)
{
Init(pwalletIn);
}
CWalletTx(const CWallet* pwalletIn, const CMerkleTx& txIn) : CMerkleTx(txIn)
{
Init(pwalletIn);
}
CWalletTx(const CWallet* pwalletIn, const CTransaction& txIn) : CMerkleTx(txIn)
{
Init(pwalletIn);
}
void Init(const CWallet* pwalletIn)
{
pwallet = pwalletIn;
vtxPrev.clear();
mapValue.clear();
vOrderForm.clear();
fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = false;
nTimeReceived = 0;
fFromMe = false;
strFromAccount.clear();
vfSpent.clear();
fDebitCached = false;
fCreditCached = false;
fAvailableCreditCached = false;
fChangeCached = false;
nDebitCached = 0;
nCreditCached = 0;
nAvailableCreditCached = 0;
nChangeCached = 0;
nTimeDisplayed = 0;
nLinesDisplayed = 0;
fConfirmedDisplayed = false;
}
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
CWalletTx* pthis = const_cast<CWalletTx*>(this);
if (fRead)
pthis->Init(NULL);
char fSpent = false;
if (!fRead)
{
pthis->mapValue["fromaccount"] = pthis->strFromAccount;
std::string str;
BOOST_FOREACH(char f, vfSpent)
{
str += (f ? '1' : '0');
if (f)
fSpent = true;
}
pthis->mapValue["spent"] = str;
}
nSerSize += SerReadWrite(s, *(CMerkleTx*)this, nType, nVersion,ser_action);
READWRITE(vtxPrev);
READWRITE(mapValue);
READWRITE(vOrderForm);
READWRITE(fTimeReceivedIsTxTime);
READWRITE(nTimeReceived);
READWRITE(fFromMe);
READWRITE(fSpent);
if (fRead)
{
pthis->strFromAccount = pthis->mapValue["fromaccount"];
if (mapValue.count("spent"))
BOOST_FOREACH(char c, pthis->mapValue["spent"])
pthis->vfSpent.push_back(c != '0');
else
pthis->vfSpent.assign(vout.size(), fSpent);
}
pthis->mapValue.erase("fromaccount");
pthis->mapValue.erase("version");
pthis->mapValue.erase("spent");
)
// marks certain txout's as spent
// returns true if any update took place
bool UpdateSpent(const std::vector<char>& vfNewSpent)
{
bool fReturn = false;
for (int i=0; i < vfNewSpent.size(); i++)
{
if (i == vfSpent.size())
break;
if (vfNewSpent[i] && !vfSpent[i])
{
vfSpent[i] = true;
fReturn = true;
fAvailableCreditCached = false;
}
}
return fReturn;
}
// make sure balances are recalculated
void MarkDirty()
{
fCreditCached = false;
fAvailableCreditCached = false;
fDebitCached = false;
fChangeCached = false;
}
void BindWallet(CWallet *pwalletIn)
{
pwallet = pwalletIn;
MarkDirty();
}
void MarkSpent(unsigned int nOut)
{
if (nOut >= vout.size())
throw std::runtime_error("CWalletTx::MarkSpent() : nOut out of range");
vfSpent.resize(vout.size());
if (!vfSpent[nOut])
{
vfSpent[nOut] = true;
fAvailableCreditCached = false;
}
}
bool IsSpent(unsigned int nOut) const
{
if (nOut >= vout.size())
throw std::runtime_error("CWalletTx::IsSpent() : nOut out of range");
if (nOut >= vfSpent.size())
return false;
return (!!vfSpent[nOut]);
}
int64 GetDebit() const
{
if (vin.empty())
return 0;
if (fDebitCached)
return nDebitCached;
nDebitCached = pwallet->GetDebit(*this);
fDebitCached = true;
return nDebitCached;
}
int64 GetCredit(bool fUseCache=true) const
{
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
// GetBalance can assume transactions in mapWallet won't change
if (fUseCache && fCreditCached)
return nCreditCached;
nCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*this);
fCreditCached = true;
return nCreditCached;
}
int64 GetAvailableCredit(bool fUseCache=true) const
{
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
if (fUseCache && fAvailableCreditCached)
return nAvailableCreditCached;
int64 nCredit = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < vout.size(); i++)
{
if (!IsSpent(i))
{
const CTxOut &txout = vout[i];
nCredit += pwallet->GetCredit(txout);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error("CWalletTx::GetAvailableCredit() : value out of range");
}
}
nAvailableCreditCached = nCredit;
fAvailableCreditCached = true;
return nCredit;
}
int64 GetChange() const
{
if (fChangeCached)
return nChangeCached;
nChangeCached = pwallet->GetChange(*this);
fChangeCached = true;
return nChangeCached;
}
void GetAmounts(int64& nGeneratedImmature, int64& nGeneratedMature, std::list<std::pair<CBitcoinAddress, int64> >& listReceived,
std::list<std::pair<CBitcoinAddress, int64> >& listSent, int64& nFee, std::string& strSentAccount) const;
void GetAccountAmounts(const std::string& strAccount, int64& nGenerated, int64& nReceived,
int64& nSent, int64& nFee) const;
bool IsFromMe() const
{
return (GetDebit() > 0);
}
bool IsConfirmed() const
{
// Quick answer in most cases
if (!IsFinal())
return false;
if (GetDepthInMainChain() >= 1)
return true;
if (!IsFromMe()) // using wtx's cached debit
return false;
// If no confirmations but it's from us, we can still
// consider it confirmed if all dependencies are confirmed
std::map<uint256, const CMerkleTx*> mapPrev;
std::vector<const CMerkleTx*> vWorkQueue;
vWorkQueue.reserve(vtxPrev.size()+1);
vWorkQueue.push_back(this);
for (int i = 0; i < vWorkQueue.size(); i++)
{
const CMerkleTx* ptx = vWorkQueue[i];
if (!ptx->IsFinal())
return false;
if (ptx->GetDepthInMainChain() >= 1)
continue;
if (!pwallet->IsFromMe(*ptx))
return false;
if (mapPrev.empty())
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const CMerkleTx& tx, vtxPrev)
mapPrev[tx.GetHash()] = &tx;
}
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, ptx->vin)
{
if (!mapPrev.count(txin.prevout.hash))
return false;
vWorkQueue.push_back(mapPrev[txin.prevout.hash]);
}
}
return true;
}
bool WriteToDisk();
int64 GetTxTime() const;
int GetRequestCount() const;
void AddSupportingTransactions(CTxDB& txdb);
bool AcceptWalletTransaction(CTxDB& txdb, bool fCheckInputs=true);
bool AcceptWalletTransaction();
void RelayWalletTransaction(CTxDB& txdb);
void RelayWalletTransaction();
};
/** Private key that includes an expiration date in case it never gets used. */
class CWalletKey
{
public:
CPrivKey vchPrivKey;
int64 nTimeCreated;
int64 nTimeExpires;
std::string strComment;
//// todo: add something to note what created it (user, getnewaddress, change)
//// maybe should have a map<string, string> property map
CWalletKey(int64 nExpires=0)
{
nTimeCreated = (nExpires ? GetTime() : 0);
nTimeExpires = nExpires;
}
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
if (!(nType & SER_GETHASH))
READWRITE(nVersion);
READWRITE(vchPrivKey);
READWRITE(nTimeCreated);
READWRITE(nTimeExpires);
READWRITE(strComment);
)
};
/** Account information.
* Stored in wallet with key "acc"+string account name.
*/
class CAccount
{
public:
std::vector<unsigned char> vchPubKey;
CAccount()
{
SetNull();
}
void SetNull()
{
vchPubKey.clear();
}
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
if (!(nType & SER_GETHASH))
READWRITE(nVersion);
READWRITE(vchPubKey);
)
};
/** Internal transfers.
* Database key is acentry<account><counter>.
*/
class CAccountingEntry
{
public:
std::string strAccount;
int64 nCreditDebit;
int64 nTime;
std::string strOtherAccount;
std::string strComment;
CAccountingEntry()
{
SetNull();
}
void SetNull()
{
nCreditDebit = 0;
nTime = 0;
strAccount.clear();
strOtherAccount.clear();
strComment.clear();
}
IMPLEMENT_SERIALIZE
(
if (!(nType & SER_GETHASH))
READWRITE(nVersion);
// Note: strAccount is serialized as part of the key, not here.
READWRITE(nCreditDebit);
READWRITE(nTime);
READWRITE(strOtherAccount);
READWRITE(strComment);
)
};
bool GetWalletFile(CWallet* pwallet, std::string &strWalletFileOut);
#endif